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INTRODUCTION
Large commercial aircraft is one of the areas in which the United States accuse European governments of unfair trade practices. The German Expert Council to the German government has also been highly critical about government support to AIRBUS (Sachverstandigenrat, 1988) . AIRBUS Industries is undoubtedly heavily supported by subsidies from all participating countries. From 1970 up to today at least 11-12 Billion US-$ have been paid by European governments; some American estimates of that support come to as much as 20
Billion US-$. The development of the A330/340 will require several billion more in the next few years. The cause for these payments was the decision of European governments in the late 1960's to support market entry of an European competitor in the market for large transport aircraft.
In public many reasons are given to support the decision to enter this market; some are economic, some are political:
-There are only two American producers, with one producer, BOEING, having monopoly power in one market segment and this.'producer may in the future dominate the market.
-The aerospace"industry is considered to be a catalyst of high technology as far as materials, electronics, and R&D management is concerned.
-About one half of aerospace turnover -in countries having such an industry -is military products. Since military procurement is highly volatile, capacity utilization can be improved if the share of military contracts is reduced.
-Spin-offs from military aerospace activities can be profitably used in civil activities.
These arguments all refer to the benefits of market entry, most of which are rather difficult to assess. Little is -3 -known quantitatively about the economic impact of spin-offs and other external effects. It even remains an open question whether -without reference to these externalities -entry in the market for large transport aircraft by a European producer would be a profitable option from a business as well as a European or world welfare standpoint. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the likely results of market entry over the next two decades and to estimate the additional cost which a firm faces when it enters the market for transport aircraft late.
After a short historical review of the aerospace sector the characteristics of the industry as far as they are important for this study are reviewed. The Cournot-Nash model of a capacity game is then calibrated to the expected market for large transport aircraft. A monopoly and a duopoly with equal entry times as alternative market structures are simulated and compared to the calibrated model. Finally, the welfare effects of market entry are calculated with respect to these two alternative market structures.
MARKET STRUCTURE IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The dominance of American companies in the aerospace sector is a relatively recent phenomenon. Aircraft design and production started in Europe after World War I. It was dominated by military production. In the 1920's demand for aircraft in the United States was boosted by the federal government through its heavily subsidized air mail activities. In 1935 the United States became the largest producer of aircraft.
During World War II production capacity was expanded massively so that at the end of the war a large industrial base could be converted to produce civil versions of military aircraft. With its large distances and low competition by railroads mainly the American market grew rapidly (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1986 Large transport aircraft have a complex production technology which results in strong learning effects. An essential part of learning appears in the assembly of an aircraft.
Craftsmanship and timing of thousands of activities is required there. Such experience is embodied in the workforce and accumulates with the number of aircraft that have been produced. There is world-wide consensus that aircraft production exhibits a learning elasticity of 0.2, i.e. production cost decrease by 20 % with a doubling of output. Whereas start-up investments and R&D are costly in absolute terms, the economies of scale are dominated by the learning effect which amount to 90 % of the overall economies of scale. Some production stages,are not specific to a particular type of aircraft, such that learning effects which are realized in the production of a generic aircraft can influence marginal cost of producing another generic aircraft.
Such cross effects are strong for updated versions of an aircraft, the socalled "derivatives". Figure A2 in the appendix illustrates this fact for the A300 and its deriv--6 -ative the A310 of Airbus. For a new generic aircraft the learning curve will start higher than those of the A310 and A300-600 in Figure A2 , but it will most likely be lower than the original learning curve. These effects can be captured by economies of scope.
Industry characteristics can then be summarized under Once capacity is determined, aircraft producers have limited choice over short-run output levels. They bargain with air- was not successful commercially and the outlook was that no non-American producer could compete in size with the three firms. In this situation market entry can be viewed as a three stage decision process. First, the commitment of -9 -European governments to subsidize the launch of a new aircraft was necessary since apparently financing on capital markets without state support was not possible. Secondly, firms had to decide which market segment to enter and they had to choose a capacity which allowed them to capture the learning effects of large scale production and at the same time kept prices at a profitable level. Finally, once the two decisions are made they had to compete with the other producers in the day-to-day business of selling their product .
The first decision must be made under great uncertainty and not only economic but also political arguments govern this process. Industrial policy aspects such as the civil-military interaction in the aerospace industry were important. The capacity game over the next two decades and the allocation of resources in this industry will be the object of the analysis. In a model which simulates stylized features of the industry, it will be investigated how large the advantage of the incumbent firm still is more than 15 years after the entry of Airbus, and how this advantage may influence the capacity game and resource allocation for the next two decades. In other words, how much learning has to be invested until the entrant can compete on approximately equal terms is determined.
THE MODEL
For the purpose of this paper the political decision to support market entry is taken as given. Up to now this support has taken the form of financing the launch-investment. Such fixed cost subsidies do not affect capacity decisions of the producers. Government support, therefore, only assures that -lithe entrant stays in the market even if entry is not profitable over the planning horizon. Entry deterring pricing strategies of the incumbent producer therefore are not rational. With entry so to speak "exogenuously" given, the game amounts to a Cournot-Nash game in capacity over the planning horizon. The possibility that European governments will pay and may already have paid production subsidies is not modelled. Since these subsidies are made dependent on the development of exchange rates neither their size nor their duration is known.
The short-run price game naturally can not be empirically -12 -
SUPPLY DECISION
Since an important part of economies of scale of aircraft production are incorporated in the learning of the workforce over time, a producer must essentially decide what the production capacity for a particular aircraft will be. In reality this will be a sequential decision with updates as time goes on and external parameters such as demand change.
Nevertheless capacity decisions do have a long-run character even if they are not made once and for all. A producer i therefore faces for a given capacity a flow of production y... The cumulative production x-T at time T is then
(1) X iT = \l y. t dt. 
It is assumed that both producers have the same cost function, i.e. they are equally efficient. Since the incumbent has already realized learning effects he may be on a lower part of his learning curve thus having lower marginal cost. 
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CALIBRATION
The effects of market entry cannot be empirically investigated with historical data since Airbus is only in the process of becoming a producer of a complete family of air--15 -craft and none of its products have reached the end of a product cycle. The approach taken here relies on the history of production of Airbus and Boeing up to 1986 and then uses demand forecasts of the large producers up to the year 2006 as an empirical basis for the calibration of the model. This time period covers a complete product cycle for practically all aircraft types which are modelled here. The Airbus A330 and A340 are the exception, because they will not enter the market before 1992. Therefore demand forecasts for the longrange market will not be an entirely adequate description of the demand over the product cycle for these two aircraft types.
Demand forecasts were available for the period 1987 to the year 2000 by Boeing (Boeing Civil Aircraft Company, 1987) , Since there is no indication how large a long-run price elasticity for aircraft might be in each market segment and for aircraft overall and since it is unknown how this elasticity might be perceived by producers, elasticities are endogenous in this model. It is assumed that identical firms would earn a rate of return of about 5.5 % and the demand function is accordingly calibrated to this rate of return. This is the way in which the capacity game is modelled here.
RESULTS
The model has been calibrated to the market forecast for the for Airbus, resp. 55 % for Boeing.
-20 - However profitability is strongly affected. The simulation of identical firms produces a rate of return over the whole product cycle of 5.6 % for both firms, whereas in the base case Airbus had a rate of return of -1.2 % and Boeing +12.6 %. Competition among two equal producers leads to lower profit rates and lower total profits. The base case -24 -has resulted in total profits for both producers of $ 42.6 billion whereas two identical producers accumulate only $ 33.4 billion.
The reason why output and prices vary little relative to the variation of profits comes from the dynamic learning effects. As one can see from figure 2 the difference in marginal cost between the two producers with different entry times becomes smaller and smaller as cumulated output increases. Also the reaction functions of the two producers are rather flat in the relevant range. Scale effects are so strong that an increase in the production of the other producer which reduces residual demand will be followed by only small quantity adjustments. -25 - Figure 3 illustrates the shape of the reaction functions and the Nash-equilibria for alternative parameter values in an one-product model with similar parameter values. The lower reaction functions represent about 7 % higher marginal cost than the higher functions, i.e. equilibria III and IV characterize firms with 7 % marginal cost differentials.
WELFARE
Not only the distribution of producer rents is affected by market entry, but consumers -i.e. airlines and indirectly airline passengers -will bear the cost or benefits of this decision. Like in the computation of the producer cost of market entry the base case allocation can be compared to the two hypothetical alternatives: monopoly and duopoly of established producers. Table 6 summarizes the change in consumer surplus by comparing the base case with the alternatives. Market entry could be considered a successful antimonopoly policy from a consumer standpoint. It has welfare benefits amounting to $ 36.8 billion of which the largest share comes from the long-range market segment. If the alternative market structure without market entry would be a duopoly consumer surplus is slightly negative. (Table 7 ).
The regional distribution reveals welfare gains to Europe and the rest of the world, whereas in North-America, i.e. the United States, consumers gain and producers loose. Overall welfare effects of the Airbus market entry depend on the market structure to which the allocation is compared.
Compared to a Boeing Monopoly overall welfare is lower with
Airbus. This is so, because monopoly profits disappear and consumers gain in all regions, but by less than the profit loss. The reason for this result is, that the scale and scope effects of producing large transport aircraft are strong enough to outweigh the output reducing effects of a Boeing monopoly.
The negative welfare change does not come from the inefficient scale of production of Airbus relative to Boeing. This becomes apparent, when market entry is compared to a situation with two established American producers. The high-cost production of Airbus yields higher welfare than a duopoly with two identical firms, because the scale effects of the large producer in the unequal situation dominate the competitive effects. Since consumers in all regions loose from -31 -Airbus entry and the American producer, Boeing, gains more than American consumers loose, the market entry of Airbus yield a positive welfare change only for North-America.
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